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Abstract
Conformity behavior, i.e. the agreement between an individual’s choices and the prevailing be-
havior of a reference group, is a commonly observed phenomenon. Though some types of social
interactions may give raise to specific incentives to adopt either a majoritarian or a contrarian
behavior, we want to investigate whether the same behavioral pattern emerges even when no eco-
nomic motivator is present.
To accomplish this task, we employ an experimental Vickrey median price auction designed
to provide incentives to reveal individual preferences truthfully. Whereas we feed the control
group with just the median price, we give out additional information on other players’ bids for
those in the treated groups. These informations are designed toprovide hints at revising individual
bids.
Ourmain results point to a strong tendency of the individuals to adapt their behavior to those
of the individuals which can be observed. Moreover, although a clear shaping eﬀect (a regression
toward the median price) does emerge for the control group, the provision of information about
the actual behavior of a sample of the relevant group is able to minimize or neutralize the shaping
eﬀect. Specifically, we find that players adjust to a divergence between their bids and the average
bid of a reference group by a factor of .—.. These figures point to a relevant role for
conformity in group behavior.
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 Introduction
The existence of anomalies that are at odds with standard theories of preferences is well known
(e.g. Allais (); Kahneman and Tversky ()), as it is well known that such anomalies
tend to disappear in experimental repeated markets. According to Loomes, Starmer, and Sug-
den (), the vanishing of anomalies during repetitionmay be explained by grounding either
in the hypothesis of context independent preferences (the discovered preferences hypothesis or
one of its variant, e.g. the market discipline hypothesis) or in the hypothesis that preferences
are endogenous to the institutions through which they are elicited (the shaping hypothesis).
According to this latter hypothesis, due to the lack of well-articulated preferences any elici-
tation mechanism inevitably produces responses in which normatively irrelevant signals, i.e.
signals not conveying any information on the individuals’ actual satisfaction (e.g. the market
prices) act as cues aﬀecting the elicited values. Recent evidence has provided sound evidence
in support of the Shaping hypothesis (Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden, ; Tufano, ).
Grounding in Butler and Loomes (), in this paper we generalize the process of prefer-
ence formation in response to cues accruing from the market by considering the shaping eﬀect
as a particular case of conformity, to be meant as an individual’s intrinsic tendency to adapt her
prior knowledge and behavior to the most frequent behavioral pattern in a population (Eﬀer-
son, Lalive, Richerson, McElreath, and Lubell, ).
Although there is widespread evidence of conformity both among human (Asch, ;
Haun, van Leeuwen, Edelson, et al., ) and nonhuman animals (van de Waal, Borgeaud,
Whiten, Inomata, Triadan, Aoyama, Castillo, Yonenobu, Chen, Dorn, et al., ; Morgan
and Laland, ), quite surprisingly little attention has been paid to this phenomenon by
scholars involved in the exogenous versus the endogenous preference formation dispute.  Our
purpose is to fill this gap, by showing how conformity aﬀects the outcome of an elicitation
mechanism, even if there is no incentive for the individuals to conform.
We run an experiment based on a variant of theVickrey auction (i.e. median price auction)
to test how the information about the bidding behavior of a reference group aﬀects the elicited
values of the relevant individual.
Our main results point to a strong eﬀect of conformity, that is a strong tendency to adjust
the stated values to those of the individuals one can observe. Moreover, although a clear shap-
ing eﬀect emerges when no other information is being provided, the provision of information
about the actual behavior of a reference group neutralizes the shaping eﬀect. Specifically, we
find that players adjust to a divergence between their bids and the average bid of a reference
group by a factor of .—.. These figures point to a relevant role for conformity in
group behavior.
Indeed, in standard economic literature (with due exception of Klick and Parisi ()) conformity is either
the upshot of a rational calculation that takes into account the disutility deriving from punishment and social
exclusion (Bernheim, ), or a way to economize on the costs of acquiring information (Bikhchandani, Hirsh-
leifer, andWelch, ). These stances are grounded in the assumption of an exogenously given set ofwell-defined
preferences.

 Experimental design
In the next sectionwe briefly report the results from a paper and pencil pilot experiment which
was conducted on the th June , from . p.m. to . p.m., at the Department of Po-
litical Science of the University of Naples Federico II. All funding required to cover expenses
and payments was provided by the authors. Recruitment was done by informally asking stu-
dents attending either the course of economic policy or the course of civil law to participate in
the experiment. Participation was voluntary and no fee was granted.
Subjects were involved in a variant of the Vickrey () selling auctionwith the following
characteristics. In each of eight market periods (rounds) subjects were asked to submit mone-
tary bids corresponding to their willingness to accept an auctioned bad,  ml of an harmless
but distasting mixture of Gatorade and Vinegar (Ariely, Loewenstein, and Prelec, ). Be-
fore running the firstmarket period subjects were asked to drink a ml sample of themixture.
This was a necessary condition for participation.
Subjects bids were obtained through forms containing a a sequence of questions of the
followingkind: “Would youbewilling to accept €x to drink the liquid?”Thevalues ofx ranged
from a minimum of (€.) to a maximum of (€.). To any question of the sequence each
individual could either answer yes or no before reporting the value of her highest rejected price
— i.e., the maximum price at which she was not willing to drink the liquid — at the bottom
of the form. In what follows we adopt the convention of identifying the highest rejected price
of a given individual in a particular round as the bid of that individual in that round.
In each market period, the price was set in correspondence of the median bid. Subjects
whose bids were lower than the market price could in principle obtain the auctioned bad re-
ceiving a payment in cash equivalent to the market price. At the end of any market period a
randomexperiment determinedwith probability .whether that periodwas indeed relevant
for trading. In that case, individuals reporting an highest rejected price lower than the market
price were asked to drink the liquid with the promise of a payment in cash equal to the current
market price at the end of the experiment. There was a total of seven relevant periods (two
relevant periods both in the first and the third Sessions, three relevant periods in the second
session). The first of the three experimental Sessions lasted about  minutes. Each of the last
two lasted about one hour and a half. The average payment per subject was €..
At the beginning of the experiment, the whole group made of  participant was sum-
moned in the classroom and was randomly split into three groups of individuals (, , ),
with the first group assigned to control and the others to the alternative treatments. The first
experimental session involved the control group. The other participants were required to leave
the classroom and to show up at the door separately at agreed times.
At the end of anymarket period the prevailing price wasmade public. It was written on the
blackboard and any subject could observe it until the end of the followingmarket period, when
another price was established. This was the only information provided to subjects belonging
to the control group.
Individuals belonging to the treatment groups were given additional information. In par-

ticular, subjects belonging to the first treatment group, whose bids were below (above) the
market price at the end of the previous market period, could observe, from the third period
on, all the bids below (above) the market price in that period. They could not infer who did
a particular bid. Neither they were informed that only information of a given type was given
to them. They simply received an additional sheet of paper in which it was stated that some of
their colleagues had done the reported bids in the previous market period.
Subjects belonging to the second treatment group received additional information after
the third period, when the distribution of the individuals’ preferences should have been more
stable. In particular, those making the nd and the rd lowest bids (resp. the th and the th
highest bids) in the thirdmarket period, received, from that period on, information concerning
the bids above (resp. below) the market price in the previous period.
In what follows, we will use the abbreviations: CG(Control Group), TG(Treatment
Group ), and TG(Treatment Group ).
 Results
Themain descriptors of the experimental groups are collected in table , while the basic statis-
tical tests for their mean and variance are reported in table . The values of monetary variables
are expressed in euros.
. Median price
Finding  (Median price for CG and TG) Themedian prices of CG and TG are identical.
After the first round in which no previous median price was observable, both groups instantly
converged to the median price of .. This occurrence is particularly valuable, since it exposed
CG and theTG to the samemedianmarket price, with the TG receiving just a single type of
additional information. Basically, the contrast between TG and CG implements an almost
ideal ceteris paribus condition, as it is evident in figure .
Finding  (Sticky convergence of TGmedian price) The convergence of TG’s median price
is slow.
Though the median prices of CG and TG do converge, the speed of convergence of TG
is remarkably slower: this happened only from the sixth round onward, whereas it happened
four rounds before for TG. This testifies how the treatment administered toTG exacerbates
the tendency to taking into account the normatively irrelevant information derived by others’
players bids.

. Control group
The only information provided by the conductors to the control group was the median price
which prevailed at the previous round. Rounds  and  were found relevant and winners were
required to drink.
Finding  (Shaping eﬀect ) The value of variance of the bids in theCG steadily declines across
rounds.
The graphical depiction of the standard deviation of the control group can be seen in figure
. Its values range from . in the first round from . in the last one. This marked decline
appears as a confirmation of the shaping hypothesis. This result qualifies the control group as
an empirically valid counterfactual for the treated groups.
Finding  (Shaping eﬀect ) The average value of bids in theCG steadily converges toward the
market median price.
This can be considered as sound evidence that the information onmarketmedian price, though
not normatively relevant, strongly shaped individual bids.
. First treatment group
TheTG is our first treated group. All other conditions being equal to the control group, the
TG was given additional information according to the following scheme:
. the participants whose bids were below the market median price at the previous round
were provided with anonymous information on bids below the market median price;
. the participants whose bids were above the market median price at the previous round
were provided with anonymous information on bids above the market median price;
. the participantswhose bidswere exactly equal to themarketmedian price at the previous
round were given no additional information.
Our prior was that if a conformity eﬀect were present, the provision of normatively irrelevant
information should further increase (decrease) the average bids for the players above (below)
the median. Since the median is an impersonal summary statistic for the distribution of bids,
some bidders could be tempted to extract information from actual non-median bids and to
revise their own bids accordingly. Therefore, we expected a higher variance for TG compared
to CG, since the additional information was supposed to prevent full convergence toward the
median price.
Finding  (Variance of TG) The variance of the TG is stationary, falling in the range of .
to ..

Compared to the control group, the variance of theTGdoes not exhibit any tendence toward
decline and remains substantially stable across rounds (see figure ). The test for equality of
variances proves that the variance for TG is  higher than the variance for theCG (p-value
for the unilateral test equal to .). Since the players with bids above (below) the median
were given information on other fellow participants which also bid above (below) themedian,
this resulted in higher (lower) bids for their reference group. Across rounds, this resulted in
nondecreasing overall variance of bids, which completely oﬀsets the shaping eﬀect.
. Second treatment group
With our second treatment TG we intended to test whether conformity simply reinforces
a previously stated preference, as in the case of TG, or is it also capable of radically chang-
ing them. All other conditions being equal to the control group, the TG was provided with
additional information which is somewhat symmetrical if compared to TG:
. the participants whose bids were below the market median price at the previous round
were provided with anonymous information on bids above the market median price;
. the participants whose bids were above the market median price at the previous round
were provided with anonymous information on bids below the market median price;
. the participantswhose bidswere exactly equal to themarketmedian price at the previous
round were given no additional information.
In the case ofTG, each non-median playerwas given information about her fellow players
whose evaluations were included in the same half of distribution: themean of these bids could
be slightly higher or lower than her bid. By contrast, in the case of TG, themean of bids given
as extra informationwas strictly lower for those whowere above themedian and strictly higher
for those below the median. Also in this case, we expected that bidders would try to extract
relevant information from a set of similar bids, resulting in lower (higher) bids for those above
(below) the median and a lower overall variance compared to the CG.
Finding  (Variance of TG) Compared to CG, the variance of TG is strictly lower.
Our prior was that if a strong conformity eﬀect were present, the provision of this alterna-
tive kind of extraneous information should result in higher (lower) average bids for those who
received information on bids above (below) themedian and a lower overall variance compared
to the CG.
This eﬀect seems to be remarkably stable over the rounds, as depicted in figure : this graph
shows a clear pattern, with the standard deviation of TG closely mimicking the time path of
CG, except for a steadily lower value. The diﬀerence in variance is reported in table , with the
overall variance of TG being , lower than the control group (p =.).

. Regression analysis
In a further evaluation of our hypothesis of pervasive conformity in the treated groups, we em-
ploy an econometric model to test the impact of normatively irrelevant information on the
behavior of bidders. Specifically, we test whether the first diﬀerence in an individual’s bids
(namely, th term bt   bt 1) is responsive to the kind of information provided in the exper-
imental setting. We run the following regression model, derived in a companion theoretical
paper that can be asked directly to the authors:
bt   bt 1 =  + 
 
pmedt 1   bt 1

+ 
rt 1   bt 1
1 + rt 1
+ "t ()
where ,, and are constants to be estimated, pmedt 1 is themedianprice at previous round, rt 1
is the mean value of the bids provided as extra information, rt 1 is their standard deviation,
and " is an i.i.d. error term.
The first term on the right side of eq. (), (pmedt 1   bt 1) is the usual eﬀect of regression
toward the median, namely the shaping eﬀect. As this diﬀerence grows positive, next round’s
bid is adjusted upward when  > 0.
The term rt 1  bt 1)/(1 + rt 1) captures the value of the additional normatively irrele-
vant information for a bidder, as provided under the formof a list of bidsmade by other players.
It is measured by the simple distance between the mean of the bids provided as information
to the bidders above and below the median, discounted by its standard deviation, which func-
tions as a metric for the dispersion of the signal in the reference group. When  > 0 we find
evidence of a conformity eﬀect.
.. Estimation
Table  reports estimates results for the control group. In this case, the model estimated was
simply
bt   bt 1 =  + 
 
pmedt 1   bt 1

+ "t ()
since no additional information was given to any bidder, except for the median price. We find
that bidders adjust their current bid by a factor of  of the diﬀerence between the previ-
ous round’s median price and bid. This value will serve as a benchmark for the evaluation of
subsequent treatment eﬀects.
The results for the treated groups are reported in table . In the design of our empirical
models wemade two fundamental choices: which observations to include and which counter-
factual to employ. In our design themedian bidders did not receive any additional information
besides themedian price: consequently, the term (rt 1 bt 1)/(1+rt 1) ismissing for them.
To estimate our model, we implement two alternative specifications:
. We set the observations for the median bidders equal to zero and added a dummy for
being non-median. The results are reported in columns –.

. We excluded the observations for the median bidders altogether. The corresponding
results are reported in columns –.
Regarding the choice of an appropriate counterfactual, we estimated the models with and
without median bidders using
. a basic fixed eﬀects panel estimator;
. a fixed eﬀects panel estimator that includes the basic control group CG as an additional
counterfactual.
While the the first estimator is considered standard, the second one took explicitly advantage
of the separate control group to maximize unbiasedness of results. To this extent, we matched
every bid bt with the corresponding average bid at the same round for the control group, ac-
cording to the following formula
b^t = bt   E (bct)
whereE (bct) is the average bid for the control group at round t. The resulting first diﬀerence
in bids becomes
bt   b^t 1 = (bt   bt 1) 

E (bct)  E
 
bct 1

: ()
From this formulation it becomes clear that the observed first diﬀerence in bids is deflated by
the corresponding change in the value of average bids in the control group. Any change in
bids in the treated group that is related to the behavior of the control group is taken out by
appropriate diﬀerencing.
.. Results
Overall, the two alternative specifications with and without the median bidders display just
trivial diﬀerences in the estimated coeﬃcients, while using the definition of bt provided by eq.
 — with and without an explicit counterfactual — does make a diﬀerence. Since using b^t in
place of bt removes the variability due to the exposition of bidders to themedian price, we find
that the eﬀect size of the first adjustment term is lower when we also use the CG.This pattern
is present in both treated groups.
Finding  (Shaping eﬀect) The estimated shaping eﬀect is small and noisy.
Estimation of eq. () using the standard fixed eﬀect method can produce biased results since the term bt 1
appears on both sides of the equation. To account for endogeneity, an Arellano-Bond type of estimation is in
order. Our results show eﬀects of roughly the same sign and order of magnitude of those obtained using the
conventional fixed eﬀect estimator. Nonetheless, the consistency of this class of estimators holds only forn!1
and, given the small number of subjects involved in thepilot experiment, wehavedecidednot to include the results
of the Arellano-Bond estimation in the present paper and to defer a full exploration of the results as the data from
the actual experiment will become available.

We find evidence of a shaping eﬀect for the TG. The estimated eﬀect is positive, which re-
flects a tendency to adjust toward the median. Nonetheless, when we use the control group
as a counterfactual, the size of the eﬀect drops by . In the TG the shaping eﬀect appears
extremely noisy, with p-values uniformly distant from conventional levels of statistical signifi-
cance.
Finding  (Conformity eﬀect) The conformity eﬀect is stable and stronger than the shaping ef-
fect, especially in TG.
Across all estimates, the eﬀect of conformity is uniformly positive, though is more noisy in
the TG. The TG, on the contrary, has coeﬃcient values ranging from . to .: this
means that bidders did react to divergences between their bids and the average value of bids
provided to them as additional information, though this clue is definitely normatively irrele-
vant because of the peculiar design of this median price auction. Moreover, in the TG the
eﬀect size of conformity is always higher than the corresponding shaping eﬀect. This result
suggests that in this context, additional normatively irrelevant information does influence bid-
ding behavior and that, comparatively, the provision of information about groups of bidders
has a stronger eﬀect than the median price. We consider this result as evidence showing the
relevance of conformity over shaping.
 Conclusion
In this paper we described the results from an experiment intended to test the diﬀerential im-
pact of conformity and shaping behavior in the context of a median price auction. Using our
control group, we found evidence supporting the shaping hypothesis: across rounds, the bids’
variance steadily declines and the average bid converges toward the market median price.
Furthermore, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis of conformity in our first trated
group, as the provision of additional normatively irrelevant information prevents variance’s
shrinking, making it stationary over repetitions. More specifically, the information on the bid-
ding behaviour of other fellow participants located at the same side of the distribution, either
above or below the median, has a stronger influence than the median price: this suggests that
the shaping eﬀect can be neutralized by some specific type of information.
In the second treatment group the bids’ variance is strictly lower than the bids’ variance for
the control group. This implies that the information on the bidding behaviour of other fellow
participants located on the opposite side of the distribution— i.e. above (below) the median
if the relevant individual is below (above) the median — has a stronger eﬀect compared to
the median price. These results are confirmed by the estimates of our regression models which
testify a stronger role for conformity compared to shaping.

 Tables and graphs
. Descriptive statistics
T 
Descriptive statistics
Experimental group
Control Treatment  Treatment 
Average bid . . .
Standard deviation . . .
Median bid . . .
Subjects   
Observations   
T 
Tests of eﬀect
Meana Varianceb
(t) (c) t   c p t/c p
Treatment  Control -. . . .
Treatment  Control -. . . .
Treatment  Treatment  . . . .
a H0 : t   c > 0:
b H0 : t/c > 1:
All reported p-values result from the appropriate unidirectional test.
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. Regression models
T 
Partial adjustment model
Fixed eﬀects estimation for control group
Variable Coef. p-value
Adjustment term  . (.)
Constant -. (.)
 The dependent variable is (bt   bt 1), that is, the diﬀerence between cur-
rent and previous bid for the i-th player. The subscript i is omitted to avoid
clutter.
 Thefirst adjustment term is (pmedt 1 bt 1) reflecting the diﬀerence between
previous stage’s median price and player’s bid.

T


Pa
rti
al
ad
jus
tm
en
tm
od
el
Fi
xe
de
ﬀe
cts
est
im
ati
on
fo
rt
rea
ted
gr
ou
ps
Co
m
pl
et
eg
ro
up
W
ith
ou
tm
ed
ian
bi
dd
er
s
N
oc
on
tro
l
Co
nt
ro
l
N
oc
on
tro
l
Co
nt
ro
l
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
Co
ef.
p-
va
lu
e
Co
ef.
p-
va
lu
e
Co
ef.
p-
va
lu
e
Co
ef.
p-
va
lu
e
Ad
jus
tm
en
tt
erm

.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
Ad
jus
tm
en
tt
erm

.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
D
um
m
yf
or
ad
di
tio
na
lin
fo
pr
ov
id
ed
.

(
.
)
-
.

(
.
)
Tr
ea
tm
en
t
Ad
jus
tm
en
tt
erm

-
.

(
.
)
-
.

(
.
)
-
.

(
.
)
-
.

(
.
)
Ad
jus
tm
en
tt
erm

.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)
D
um
m
yf
or
ad
di
tio
na
lin
fo
pr
ov
id
ed
.

(
.
)
.

(
.
)

Th
ed
ep
en
de
nt
va
ria
bl
ei
s(
b t
 
b t
 
1
),
th
at
is,
th
ed
iﬀ
ere
nc
eb
et
we
en
cu
rre
nt
an
d
pr
ev
io
us
bi
d
fo
rt
he
i-t
h
pl
ay
er.
Th
es
ub
scr
ip
ti
is
om
itt
ed
to
av
oi
dc
lu
tte
r.

Th
ec
ol
um
ns
wi
th
th
eh
ea
di
ng
No
con
tro
ld
isp
lay
m
od
els
em
pl
oy
in
gj
us
tt
he
da
ta
fro
m
th
et
rea
ted
gr
ou
p,
wh
ere
as
th
ec
ol
um
ns
wi
th
th
e
he
ad
in
gC
on
tro
ld
isp
lay
m
od
els
ob
tai
ne
du
sin
gt
he
co
nt
ro
lg
ro
up
as
an
in
de
pe
nd
en
tc
ou
nt
erf
ac
tu
al.

Th
efi
rst
ad
jus
tm
en
tt
erm
is
(p
m
ed
t 
1
 
b t
 
1
)
refl
ec
tin
gt
he
di
ﬀe
ren
ce
be
tw
ee
np
re
vio
us
sta
ge
’sm
ed
ian
pr
ice
an
dp
lay
er
’sb
id
.

Th
es
ec
on
da
dj
us
tm
en
tt
erm
is
(r
t 
1
 
b t
 
1
)/
(1
+

r t 
1
)
refl
ec
tin
gt
he
di
ﬀe
ren
ce
be
tw
ee
n
pr
ev
io
us
sta
ge
’sa
ve
ra
ge
pr
ice
in
fo
rm
ati
on
pr
ov
id
ed
an
dp
lay
er
’sb
id
,d
isc
ou
nt
ed
by
th
es
tan
da
rd
de
via
tio
no
fp
ric
ei
nf
or
m
ati
on
pr
ov
id
ed
.

Al
lr
ep
or
ted
p
-va
lu
es
bo
ot
str
ap
pe
dw
ith
,

rep
eti
tio
ns
.

References
A, M. (): “Le Comportement de l’Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique
des Postulats et Axiomes de l’Ecole Américaine,” Econometrica, (), –.
A, D., G. L, D. P (): “’Coherent arbitrariness’: Stable de-
mand curves without stable preferences,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (), –
.
A, S. E. (): “Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a
unanimous majority,” Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, (), –.
B, B. D. (): “A Theory of Conformity,” Journal of Political Economy, (),
–.
B, S., D. H,  I. W (): “Learning from the behavior
of others: Conformity, fads, and informational cascades,”The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, (), –.
B, D. J.,  G. C. L (): “Imprecision as an Account of the Preference
Reversal Phenomenon,” American Economic Review, (), –.
E, C., R. L, P. J. R, R. ME,  M. L ():
“Conformists and mavericks: The empirics of frequency-dependent cultural transmission,”
Evolution and Human Behavior, (), –.
H, D., E.  L, M. E,  . (): “Majority influence in children
and other animals.,”Developmental cognitive neuroscience, , –.
K, D., A. T (): “ProspectTheory: AnAnalysis of Decision under
Risk,” Econometrica, (), –.
K, J.,  F. P (): “Social networks, self-denial, and median preferences: Con-
formity as an evolutionary strategy,” Journal of Socio-Economics, (), –.
L, G., C. S,  R. S (): “Do Anomalies Disappear in Repeated
Markets?,”The Economic Journal, (), C–C.
(): “Preference reversals and disparities between willingness to pay and willing-
ness to accept in repeated markets,” Journal of Economic Psychology, (), –.
M, T. J. H.,  K. N. L (): “The Biological Bases of Conformity,” Fron-
tiers in Neuroscience, , .

P,C.R. (): “Rational Individual Behaviour inMarkets andSocialChoice Processes,”
inTheRational Foundations of Economic Behaviour: Proceedings of the IEA Conference Held
in Turin, Italy, ed. by K. J. Arrow, E. Colombatto, M. Perlman, andC. Schmidt. Macmillan.
T, F. (): “Are ‘true’preferences revealed in repeated markets? An experimental
demonstration of context-dependent valuations,” Experimental Economics, (), –.
  W, E., C. B, A. W, T. I, D. T, K. A,
V. C, H. Y, Y. C, G. W. D,  . (): “Potent Social
Learning and Conformity Shape aWild Primate’s Foraging Decisions,” Science, (),
–.
V, W. (): “Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders,” The
Journal of Finance, (), –.

